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LEVIATHAN AND NATURAL LAW. By F. Lyman Windolph. Princeton
Univ. Press, Princeton, N. J., 1951. Pp. 147. $2.50.
Traditional natural law doctrines involve essentially a theory of posi-
tive law based on natural law. The author of "Leviathan and Natural
Law" proposes a "theory of natural law on the basis of positivism." 1 He
is well aware of the inadequacies of a purely positivist philosophy of law
and keenly conscious of the claims of the natural law school. Nevertheless
he starts with a strictly positivist analysis of legal phenomena and thus
continues the positivist divorce between morality and politics. 2 Assuming
that the "primary fact in politics is the existence of the government," 8
he asks, catechism-like, "Who made the government?" and answers "the
sovereign"-that "individual or group (however large or small) possessing
at a given time and in a given state the absolute and unlimited power to
kill and confiscate." 4 Morality and politics, being "independent realms," 5
it is "bad politics to make righteousness the test of legality." o The
sovereign speaks through Law. However unrighteous the sovereign's
commands, his courts must remain deaf to appeals to the corrective function
of natural or moral law. Thus, the "essential characteristic of the political
sovereign is the power to confiscate and condemn without a hearing." 7
If the American "sovereign" abolished today the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments by the same process with which yesterday it enacted them,
the "threatened citizen" could look "nowhere for protection," 8 tomorrow.
Upon these familiar tenets of positivism, Mr. Windolph builds his
theory of natural law. The question is whether he can do so after divorcing
a vinculo, morality and politics. Has he not, like Descartes, "thrown out
the baby with the bath water"? He condemns as "monstrous and inhuman"
the "error of Thrasymachus" which, rejecting "all faith in a moral uni-
verse," asserts "justice is whatever the sovereign commands." 9 Still, "we
need not argue that politics is a branch of ethics." 10 The implication of
inconsistency is avoided however, by the suggestion that the subject,
threatened by the unrighteous sovereign, may, and indeed sometimes must,
rebel. Rebellion successful, is revolution. The sovereign's will may be
1. Foreword, p. ix.
2. P. 20.
3. P.3.









changed or the sovereign himself may be forcibly overthrown.-1 Prompted
by the dictates of morality, revolution restores righteousness. There is here
no confusion between morality and politics, because the "right of revolu-
tion" is moral, not political.1 The conditions of its exercise are not among
the data of politics.
This is the substance of the theory as the present reviewer under-
stands it. It rests upon the validity of the author's assumptions. These
will not go without challenge. It might be said that the existence of man
rather than the "existence of the government" is the "primary fact in
politics" and that before Mr. Windolph's "Who made the government?"
comes a more fundamental "Who made Man ?" The answer gives politics
its ethical prolegomena. The American Declaration of Independence
offered such an afiswer. Men are "'created" by a divine "Creator." They
are "endowed by their Creator" with certain rights. These rights are
"unalienable" because man, as creature, cannot discharge his duties to his
Creator without them. To make these rights "secure" men "institute"
governments. They are still men when they do so, still the creatures of a
divine Creator. The acts of men in administering government thus estab-
lished, are none the less human actions. The moral law, therefore, does
not go into a state of suspended animation meanwhile. Indeed, as the
author says,'3 "moral considerations are completely relevant whenever
human actions are involved." If so, why divorce politics and morality?
Why suggest that the correction of the sovereign's unrighteousness is a
function solely of revolution?
Some will place Mr. Windolph's theory against the facts of recent
history. The Nazi "sovereign" of the Third Reich, 1933-1945, like Kreon
of old,14 did no "legal wrong" when, for instance, the genocide of the
Jewish people was attempted through "law." In that instance the sover-
eign's commands were clear, certain and consistent. The victims of Belsen
and Buchenwald could not, under the theory proposed, logically assert
in Nazi courts that the laws against them were "not laws, but perversions
of law." The sovereign had abolished the guarantees of the Weimar Con-
stitution, and the "threatened citizen" never had the chance to recover
righteousness through revolution. How then, could the "individual" or
"group" which undoubtedly possessed the "absolute and unlimited power
to kill and confiscate" in Hitler's Germany, be called to account for "crimes
against humanity" in the Nuremberg Tribunal of 1945 which proceeded as
a "court of law"? Would not the defendants' acts, under Mr. Windolph's
positivist natural law be guilty, not of "crimes," but merely of "sins"?
Cardinal Newman once said that word "God" constituted a theology
in itself. The divorce of morality from politics constitutes a Jurisprudence
in itself. So also does the attribution of the "unalienable" character of
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human rights to man's creation by God. The theory of "natural law on
positivist bases" may square with the former; it is far apart from the latter.
There is little support for the Positivist in the natural law theory of the
Declaration of Independence which but restates a tradition running through
Blackstone, Mansfield, Coke, Fortescue, and Bracton, back to the very
beginnings of the common law and beyond. It might be noted too, that
the "forgotten Amendment" to the Constitution-the Ninth---embodies the
natural law philosophy of the Declaration. If "the enumeration of certain
rights" in the Constitution, "shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people," these retained rights must exist in virtue
of some other law, superior to the Constitution. A right is the product of
law. The paradox of authentic and original American Constitutional Law
is the self-limitation of the American "sovereign" by moral or natural law.
The Constitution of the United States does not embody Jean Bodin's
theory of sovereignty. It does not divorce morality and politics.
That a lawyer of Mr. Windolph's acknowledged eminence felt called
upon to try to find a place for "natural law" even in a positivist "frame of
reference" proves that the current revival of interest in natural law doc-
trines is not merely academic. After generations of contemptuous neglect
resulting in the amoral legalism of Holmes which is discussed in one of the
best chapters of "Leviathan and Natural Law," 15 the traditional doctrines
again command attention. As Etienne Gilson has said, "The natural law
always buries its undertakers." 10 The old doctrines are indeed treated
with candor and moderation by Mr. Windolph. We may doubt, however,
that Aquinas may be cited in favor of the author's positivist view of the
sovereign's absolutism,17 especially after Aquinas' unmistakable declaration
that "if, in any point a human law departs from the law of nature, it is no
longer a law but a perversion of law," 18 an assertion which Mr. Windolph
thinks "results in confusion." 19 Again, the question whether moral or
natural law is normative of man-made law is not helped by repeating the
positivist question-begging tautology--"there can be no legal rights against
the authority that makes the law upon which the right depends." 20 Mr.
Windolph's strictures on Blackstone's definition of municipal law,2 1 likewise
fail to note that the concluding words "commanding what is right and pro-
hibiting what is wrong" are to be read with Blackstone's previous ac-
ceptance of the natural law. As Hammond says,22 "that the rights and
wrongs of municipal law must necessarily be consistent with the law of
nature is merely a logical corollary to the doctrine of this section." Of
course, Blackstone's definition will not meet with the approval of those who
15. Ch. 8.
16. GiLsoN, THE UNrTY OF PHILOSOPHIcAL EXPERIENcE 306 (1937).
17. Foreword, p. viii.
18. Summa Theologica, Ia, Hae, qu. 95 art. 2.
19. Text, p. 131, Notes and Commentary, note to Text, p. 29.
20. Text, p. 23.
21. 1 BL. Comm. 125.
22. Ibid., p. 125.
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divorce morality and politics, natural law and positive law. But if Mr.
Windolph agrees that "legality is not the test of righteousness," 23 and
that there is no such principle as that "the state can do no moral wrong," 24
it would seem that logically his "natural law" should have a wider and a
deeper function than that which he apparently allows it.
"Leviathan and Natural Law" is an important and thought-provoking
book. It is noteworthy that its author, unlike others,2 who appear alarmed
by the "theological implications" they think acceptance of natural law
doctrines involves, is not frightened by such specters. Indeed, all of us,
whatever our degree of agreement or disagreement with Mr. Windolph's
interesting thesis, will sincerely applaud the sentences with which he
concludes:
". . government of the people means a government ordained and
established by a democratic sovereign. Government by the people
means a government either purely democratic or republican in form.
Government for the people means 'a government conducted in accord-
ance with the developing principles of natural justice. If the last is
an illusion, or comes generally to be regarded as an illusion, the first
and second will surely perish from the earth." 26
The question remains, however, whether "natural law" as Mr. Windolph
conceives it is strong enough to prevent the catastrophe.
Edward F. Barrett t
SEX AND TIE LAw. By Morris Ploscowe. Prentice-Hall, N. Y., 1951.
Pp. 310. $3.95.
Judge Ploscowe brings between covers a much needed orderly survey
and commentary on American laws of marriage, annulment, divorce, illegi-
timacy and sex crimes. What are his findings and what meaning do they
have in terms of present day American democratic society? In succeeding
chapters there is reiterated in sharp relief the inescapable fact that legal
sanctions alone against human instinctual drives, sexual or aggressive,
meet neither the needs of the individual nor insure the stability of the social
group. This fact has a sobering cogency in our time of social ferment,
marked by a moral shift and lessened repression, by community reaction
to an awareness of diminishing strength of the group conscience, heretofore
reinforced by supernatural and authoritarian sanctions, and by a turn to
23. Text, p. 26.
24. Id., p. 24.
25. Howe, The Positivism of Mr. S.Ts~ce Holmne, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 529, 530
(1951). Gerhart, The Doctrine of Natural Law, 26 N.Y.U.L. Rev.. 76, 119, 118
(1951).
26. P. 125.
t-Associate Professor of Law, Editor, Proceedings of the Natural Law Institute,
University of Notre Dame.
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and clamor for more government regulation and control of social life, more
secular law, more severe punishments and more policemen. This trend
has found expression in a growing public reactive anxiety and awareness
of what is said to be an increasing incidence of delinquency and crime asso-
ciated with sexuality, much of which has emerged in disguised form, in
fact and in fantasy. In both the incidence is high, if in the former we are to
accept Kinsey's statistics on licit and illicit male sexuality in America, and
in the latter if we ponder the deluge of exhibitionism, violence, sadism, the
masquerade of sexual perversity in whole pages of gossip columns, in
modern mass advertisements, of Hollywood, show business, comic books
and crime fiction which dominate the cultural scene.
In the face of Judge Ploscowe's array of facts it would be hard to
question the wisdom of his counsels for legislative change. Thus if the
institution of marriage is to be less a legitimization of copulation and more
truly an enhancement of individual growth and social maturity, many legal
and administrative practices will have to be changed. Marriage is too easy,
especially for the immature, the physically and mentally unfit. The divorce
rate is in good measure the result of legal indifference to unwise marriages.
The chapter on divorce is an engaging commentary on the folklore of self-
deception. In point is the basic premise of the law that an action in divorce
must be a contest; that it requires a punishment-for-sin, and reward-for-
virtue adjudication. Action for divorce should be on a grown-up level of
negotiation. The law requires it to be a ritualistic connivance of perjury
and fantasy in which the important psychological and social issues are un-
welcome. Divorce courts ignore the disciplines that have been dealing with
domestic problems for years: family case work, psychiatry, marriage coun-
seling, probation, etc. Ploscowe recommends the use of such disciplines
and only after experts in such fields despair and after a probationary period
of separation should a divorce be granted.
The common law of illegitimacy is discriminatory and barbaric and
it cannot prevail if a democratic system of law is to have real meaning.
Only one state (Arizona) has made a complete break with the common law
and has subscribed to the rule that every child of natural parents is legiti-
mate and entitled to equality before the law. New legislation is required
in regard to the evidentiary aspects of paternity adjudications. "The
Lord Mansfield Rule should be relegated to the limbo of forgotten law."
Ploscowe speaks reassuringly that judges and juries know how babies are
made, but this rule is a prissy injunction against the admission of testimony
with respect to when and to access or non access, before the judgment of
legitimacy is rendered. The time is at hand when the use of established
scientific methods should no longer be left to bias or caprice. For example,
legislative amendment to evidentiary law is needed in respect to the use
and acceptance of blood grouping tests which are unassailable as a method
of paternity determination by exclusion.
The chapter on rape erects a sound frame of reference for the assess-
ment of forced sexual relations. Judge Ploscowe points out that intuition
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of courts and juries exerts a larger influence in rape prosecutions than the
letter of the law; only some 20% of statutory cases being convicted. But
social policy with respect to rape cannot be left to chance local circumstance
or to the individual character problems of the prosecutor, judge or juror.
The modern law of rape has gone far beyond the reach of common law con-
cepts limiting it to the brutal violation of the person and to the abnormality
inherent in sex play with children. These should be the limiting basis of
modern law of rape. Under present rules of law too many boys under
21 are branded as felons for having intercourse with girls 16 or 17, who
may or may not be accomplished prostitutes. Vis haud ingrata. Simple
fornication is not rape.
In the chapter on homosexuality, sodomy and crimes against nature the
author is on solid ground. In no area of sexual life is there a better expres-
sion of the fact that pious legislation does not change human behavior. The
law dealing with sexual deviations has the character of a barbaric exorcism
not unlike flagellation for the expulsion of demons. It has little utility be-
yond a permissive orgy of sadistic sacrifice of scapegoats and the invitation
to mischief, including blackmail. Modern society should be ready to accept
the fact that most fixed deviations of sexual expressions are matters of
psychopathology and benign from a social welfare standpoint; that changes
in behavior can be achieved only through the influence of religion, psy-
chiatry, social work and education. To be sure, children and minors must
be protected against sexual advances, either homosexual or heterosexual,
but a great deal more will be achieved in the matter if we are mindful that
the deterrent effect of law is less than implied and that the law only waits
for the commission of the offense and acts afterwards. Premature sex
experience of the minor is per se harmful, but this is not the central issue
after the fact; much if not more harm can be added by the morbid excite-
ment of both law and those adults immediately involved. Hence the
handling of the case more often compounds the child's problem of psychic
mastery and recovery.
Judge Ploscowe's analysis of the psychopathic sex offender laws should
be absorbed by every legislator. The single airn of such legislation is the
isolation of the potential sex killer, which has not been met before nor will
it be by the recent sex offender enactments. Such laws have been promul-
gated more as wish fulfillments; worse, they place upon the shoulders of
the psychiatrists the entire task of discrimination, prediction and judgment.
Worse still, such laws provide no implementation. They do not underwrite
the more expensive, sober, tedious business of scientific investigation, re-
search and treatment, nor provide facilities and inducements to attract
inquiring minds to the problem.
In the introduction of this book Roscoe Pound makes the observation
that in the United States there is no well organized provision for creative
law making, no machinery for the preparation of legislation imperatively
called for in judge Ploscowe's monograph. Pound advises that, "There
is need of permanent bodies, with security of tenure, adequate facilities,
19521
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competent investigators, opportunities for dealing with questions as wholes
rather than in detached local fragments and scientific spirit and method."
Judge Ploscowe's book should be read by every lawyer, judge, legis-
lator, psychiatrist, social worker and educator. It is a first step and guide to
a more rational and realistic approach to the legal problems of group
security and control of sexual life.
Philip Q. Roche, M.D. t
THE Cy PRES DoCTRINE IN THE UNITED STATES. By Edith L. Fisch.
Matthew Bender & Co., Inc., Albany, N. Y., 1950. Pp. 275. $10.00.
The years since the turn of the century have been stirring ones for
charitable trusts in this country, and have seen enormous growth in their
size and comprehension A combination of powerful forces, increased
wealth, increased taxation, and a wider vision of this country's needs,
among them, have led to this growth. Size has been accompanied by her
inevitable hand maiden, criticism.' It is not enough, say the critics, that
charitable trusts should exist; more, they must exist for useful purposes.
One tool to help render charitable trusts useful is the ancient cy pres
doctrine, defined by Miss Fisch as "a saving device applied to charitable
trusts so that when the precise intention of the settlor cannot be carried
out his intention can be carried out as nearly as possible." Obscurely born
in antiquity, it is available to modern courts to rescue or remodel charitable
trusts which must otherwise fail, and consequently ought to form a power-
ful weapon in any equity court's armory. It has remained for Miss Fisch
to give us a full dress treatment of it in all is ramifications in the United
States.
She has done an excellent job. Beginning ab ovo, she has traced
the history of the doctrine abroad and in this country up to the present,
recording the obstacles to its acceptance and classifying each state alpha-
betically as to acceptance, with very complete citations for all twenty-nine
which have adopted it. Courts in five states have rejected it; in some others
statutes have specifically authorized its use; and in nine states neither
courts nor legislatures appear to have decided the matter.
Having traced the "reception" of the doctrine, Miss Fisch proceeds
to break down the requirements for its application.2 In her belief, an earlier
reluctance to resort to this saving device except where the terms of the
trust were literally impossible, is giving way to a willingness to apply it
whenever doing so will best serve the essential purposes of the settlor and
of society.3 The author leaves you in no doubt whatever that her sym-
tPsychiatrist, University of Pennsylvania Medical School.





pathies lie with greater liberality; nay, that she believes the modem trend
vital to justify the favors shown by legislatures and the public upon
charitable trusts.4
But with all this benevolence on the parts of courts and legislatures,
the fact remains that many groups are suspicious of the way charitable
trusts are in fact being administered. The CIO and the Textile Workers
Union of America, resentful of Mr. Royal Little's manipulation of Textron
and its subsidiaries, wrote an imposing brief strongly raking abuses of a
favored position by charitable trusts used purely as a cloak for business
manipulations; not to discount the force of their arguments, one must still
remember that what really worried them was the chronic unemployment
of the New England textile industry. Others, too, from different stand-
points, have pointed out the apathy, dormancy, and lack of point in the
administration of such trusts. 5
Certainly Miss Fisch is right in pointing out that a prime weakness
of the law as it stands is that only the trustees or the Attorney General
of the state where the trust is domiciled have standing to petition the courts
for application of the doctrine.6 Sleepy and complacent (the CIO would
add, devious or wicked) trustees are unlikely to do so; and a busy Attorney
General is unlikely ever to know what's going on in the charitable trusts
which are ostensibly under his supervision. In 1943 New Hampshire,
whose citizens will surely not resent my saying that it is hardly a "wel-
fare state," enacted a statute requiring registration of all public trusts to-
gether with annual reports, and authorizing the Attorney General to in-
vestigate suspiciously dormant or dubious charitable funds. It is too early
to pass final judgment on the workings of this statute, but Miss Fisch
reports that it waked up the trusts and set them in useful motion. Very
likely similar statutes are part of the wave of the future.
However there remain some crucial questions unanswered; they may
be unanswerable. For instance, when does it become "impossible" to carry
out the purposes of a given trust? If the intended charity is illegal or ceases
to exist, the answer is easy; but closer cases are not so clear, and need not
be left to the imagination. Suppose in the nineteenth century an Hibernian
settlor leaves a New England university of some repute (even in Chicago-
land) a sum of money to provide scholarships for Massachusetts men named
O'Toolihan, and suppose that the only O'Toolihan present is a very poor
student and not expected to survive the next exams; can the income be
turned over to a top-notch Californian named Murphy-or Mendoza?
Or again, suppose vast funds left to this same university for Greek and
Latin prizes, and only a very few persons now take the classics; can the
university arrange to divert these funds to "mere" physicists and mathe-
maticians who are worthy and in need? These examples are not hypo-
thetical; rather, they typify a current and very real problem. The difficulty
4. Preface, v.
5. 198 HARxwz's 28 (March 1949) ; LooK MAG., Feb. 19, 1952.
6. P. 202.
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with them is not that performance according to the terms of the trust is
"impossible" but that it is undesirable. I venture to state that in many
courts so long as there is one Boston O'Toollihan he will get his scholarship,
however undeserving he may be. Those courts may, after all, be right in
the end, for if courts begin to interfere in cases which fall short of "impos-
sibility" it will become exceedingly hard to draw a line for them to stop at,
and conceivably private charitable trusts as we know them might end. Still,
one can't help a wistful wish that Murphy could get the scholarship.
If Miss Fisch has not been able to answer this, and some other ques-
tions, that is not to say that she has not written a full, scholarly, and useful
book, which is both particular where it needs to be and general enough
throughout to show us the wider implications of the developing doctrine
of cy pres.
Samuel M. Fahr t
t Asst. Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law.
